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Post by pat perry on Aug 31, 2015 8:45:44 GMT 9
From Bobski - Pat P
Bruce, you're gonna love this story! Give Jim a shout!
Sent from my iPhone, Bobski
Begin forwarded message: From: James Latta <jaypeelatta@gmail.com> Date: August 17, 2015 at 9:29:47 PM EDT To: Bobski9933@aol.com Subject: B58 Hustler Intercept I rotated back to the States in 1962 from Yakota, Japan. I was stationed at Langley AFB and spent about three years there before orders came through sending me to the 5th FIS at Minot, N.D. I had been in the Air Force about 12 years and had about 3300 hours total time and about 900 of it in the Six.
I arrived there in early January 1966 convinced that I would serve out my commitments to the AF and then resign and go fly for the airlines. Their money was very good. I was up front with Col. Fowler and told him that I would get out of the Air Force the next Jan when all of my commitments were satisfied. He understood. I liked him a lot and would do any thing for him. It hurt me very much when he was killed landing at Minot during an ORI we were getting. Col. Fowler had been up without sleep for a very long time.
Like all new pilots to a squadron, I had to be checked out on the area, etc. and I had to convince some IP that they could trust me with their airplanes. The squadron was hit with an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) or some such inspection and, since the airlines needed all the airspace during the daylight hours, we flew at night. I was scheduled with an I. P. (a Major, as I remember. I was still a Captain but expected to make Major that October, if I stayed in the AF).
We preflighted our B model Six and then waited. Eventually we were scrambled some time dark and dirty and we took off. I contacted Semi Automatic Ground Environment, ( SAGE) control and we proceed under DATA link. I flew the command speed and the autopilot flew the command heading and altitude. (The guy at SAGE could only command altitude changes but before the autopilot had to have a thrust excess, or a lack thereof, to go to the new altitude when I set the throttle. They could send commands for heading and altitude that my aircraft would automatically follow but he could command altitude and airspeed all he wanted but unless I moved the throttle nothing happened.) Pretty soon I was paired with a target. I knew this by the DATA link commands slewing around and settling down on new values and, a target symbol, etc. appearing on my Tactical Situation Display. (TSD). The TSD was a display about 12 inches in diameter just in front of the control stick. A target reference circle also appeared on my radar scope,
We were about 100 miles southeast of Minot and I was commanded on a northerly heading, parallel to, but on the reciprocal of the targets heading and offset to the west of his track by about 30 miles. Wanting to get as much info on this target as possible, I reached down on the right hand console, near my right knee and pressed a little button. ( I don’t know now what it was called. I did know that when I pressed it the MA-1 Fire Control System would take away my command Mach and replace it for about 10 seconds with the targets mach.) His mach came up as .97 mach. I almost swallowed my gum. I was paired with a B-58.
We knew that target A/C like the T-33 cruised at about .76 Mach the B-52 about the same, the B-57 a little higher. Only the B-58 cruised at .97 mach. ( 97 Mach sounds a little high to me now. Maybe it was more like .93)
I immediately pressed the mic button and asked the guy on the scope in SAGE to give me a set up for a front beam attack. The IP in the back seat asked, “what’s up”. I told him we were paired with a Hustler and he asked how did I know. (I was accustomed to have fellow pilots not knowing as much as I did and I don’t say that to boast or put anyone down. It was just that I had flown more than others of the same rank.) I was too busy to explain it to him. I asked again for a front beam. Nothing. Most of the SAGE controllers were pretty young, shy and ignorant. I didn’t want to broadcast that I thought I was paired with a Mach 2 target for fear that the B-58 would hear, be alerted and start his acceleration early.
The SAGE computer gathered all this target information from the many radar stations around the system and then spit it out in one of two modes: Modified Close Control (MCC) or Close Control. (CC). In CC the SAGE computer would solve the entire intercept problem: target position, speed, heading, altitude, etc. It would then send via DATA link the commands that I was to fly. All the while it was doing this it was also sending to my computer in the Six the info necessary for the Six’s computer to solve the intercept. The Six stored this data in case we lost communications through the DATA link.
The computer on the ground could only handle about 125 CC intercepts at one time or it would become overloaded. And, it was very slow. We were always controlled in CC mode and invariably when we looked into the radar scope to find the target it was never in the center of the target reference circle but was usually near the bottom of the circle—sometimes it was concealed by the target reference circle. SAGE could handle many more intercepts in MCC mode. (In MCC the Six’s computer solved the intercept problem about 9 times a second.) In spite of this we ALWAYS operated in CC mode. If we lost DATA link , as we sometimes did when running low altitude intercepts, it would automatically revert to MCC mode and My computer would start solving the intercept and the target reference circle would jump to put the target dead center as it should have been. I couldn't understand why we didn't use CC as our normal mode of operation. It would have been much better. For one thing, it would permit me to select the attack I wanted, after all, the guys in the cockpit usually were older and more experienced than the guys on the scope. It would have feed the SAGE computers, which were obviously overloaded.
The SAGE computer, in CC mode, would only spit out three intercepts: a head-on, a front beam (about 135 degrees off his tail) or a stern chase. Since the Six was deemed to have a speed advantage over subsonic targets, we almost always were set up for a stern chase: however. I had heard that these B-58 guys were a little crafty and they would sometimes wait until we were committed to a stern chase and then they would start accelerating to Mach 2.0. We would then run out of fuel chasing them and never catching them.
I asked the guy on the scope once more for a front beam, but all I got was silence. These guys were usually new to the A.F., the SAGE system and almost everything else. I decided not to press my luck. I was getting an evaluation and since I would be more apt to screw up a head-on or a front beam attack at high mach numbers, and since it was almost impossible to screw up a stern chase, I decided to shut up and let things proceed. After all, it could be another Six or a Voodoo or something else as target and maybe they wouldn’t accelerate.
My IP kept asking how it was that I knew we were paired with a B-58. I was still too busy trying to figure out what I should do and watching the intercept develop on my TSD to explain it to him.
As I have said, we were on a northerly heading a reciprocal of the targets heading and we were almost abeam of him. My personal pride took over and I was determined that we would not fail on this intercept. I lit the afterburner and started to accelerate. At about 1.1 mach I judged that I should start my turn and get behind the B-58. I completed the 180 degree turn with about 1.4 mach and was about 10 miles, more or less, behind him. About this time the controller at SAGE informed me that the target was accelerating. I knew it. I knew it. The Hustler crew, those dirty dogs, had tried to suck me into a high speed chase; however, I already had a lock-on and could see that I had bit of a speed advantage. I pressed on.
The target and I were still accelerating but I was closing on the target. I don’t remember how high the mach number got but we were getting close to mach 2. I was getting close to firing range and my radar indicated “twenty second to launch”. ( Did I say that I had selected the MB-1 as my weapon). My speed advantage had slowly dropped off and it took more than 20 seconds to reach firing position, but we did.
At the fire signal, I went into the “escape maneuver”. The book called for a roll of at least 90 degrees but no more than 120 degrees and a turn of about 180 degrees. However, at these mach numbers the air loads on the elevon controls caused the Six to respond slowly. I rolled, pulled as hard as I could on the stick and came out of burner. These abrupt changes caused one great big compressor stall. I had quite a bit of experience with the Six when it got a belly ache and was not too concerned, the guy in the back was concerned and asked, “What’s that”. I just said “compressor stall”. I wanted to savior my victory.
He later told me that it was the first compressor stall that he had ever witnessed up close. At night they would get your attention—big bang and flames out the intakes. Earlier, back at Langley, when I had only about 20 hours of Six time, I was told to take an “A” model Six and take it to some high mach number. I was over the Dismal Swamp on the Virginia, North Carolina border and accelerating when, as I approached about 1.5 mach, the burner blew out and the Six got a big belly ache. It kept stalling. It would not quit. At the same time the “Variable Ramp” light came on. I was convinced that I was a goner so I sat there with my shoulders hunched so hard that later my back hurt. It sounded like someone was right behind the cockpit with a burlap bag full of empty cans. Ever few seconds he would shake the hell out of those cans and then you could feel the Six start to gather its self for a HUMUNGOUS compressor stall and then WHAM. After about six or eight of those, I had slowed to near mach 1 and the compressor stalls stopped. Afterward I asked the Pratt and Whitney Tech. Rep. what damage had been done and what major repairs would have to be made. His reply was “nothing. Compressor stalls are good for it. They clean it out inside”. They almost cleaned me out inside, too.
I don’t remember the rest of the flight but I have often wondered how many other Six driver have had success against the B-58.
Thanks for accommodating an old man…I’ll tell you some other time about Col. Fowler’s tragic death.
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Post by pat perry on Aug 31, 2015 8:46:40 GMT 9
From Bobski - Pat P.
James —
Excellent story! I could follow you all the way — I ate it up!
I flew both the F-102 and the F-106 against Hustlers, and failed each time. The F-102 was completely outclassed, and in my F-106 intercept we were forbidden to go supersonic so I just trailed my Hustler at about .98 Mach and couldn’t catch him.
What year were you doing your intercept? It sounds like your SAGE had some features that I didn’t see in the 1968 time frame.
Once, the SAGE computer failed during an ORI when I was already paired with a low-level target about 20 miles away. The controller told me to break off the intercept because he no longer could function. I took a JUDY, and he was happy. I descended to low level and found the target, not too far out of the target marker circle, and got an MA. It was a critical intercept in passing the ORI, and the brass was pleased.
On another ORI I got paired with a target which was just about to leave the intercept area. The controller asked if I could accelerate the intercept to catch the target before he got into congested airspace and we’d have to break off. I accelerated to Mach 1.8, and had WSEMS on board, so I did the whole doors open, rails extend, retract, doors close routine at Mach 1.8. While the book said it was within limits, I was wondering what I would do if the airspeed blew the doors off the plane!
I also had compressor stalls in the F-106. I was flying an FCF (functional check flight) and it included a Mach 2 run. I got up to about Mach 1.85 when I heard a rumble, then BANG! BANG! The Six seemed to go sideways. I came out of burner and thought the engine was coming apart. I was thinking that I couldn’t eject at that speed, as I’d be torn apart. Everything settled down and I landed without further incident. As in your case, the Tech Rep said that compressor stalls didn’t hurt anything — but they sure scared the crap out of me!
Congratulations again on the excellent B-58 story!
Will you be at the Colorado Springs F-106 reunion in October?
Bruce Gordon 94th=
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Jim Scanlon (deceased)
Senior Staff
FORUM CHAPLAIN
Commander South Texas outpost of the County Sligo Squadron
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Post by Jim Scanlon (deceased) on Aug 31, 2015 11:48:24 GMT 9
James Latta said: "Thanks for accommodating an old man…I’ll tell you some other time about Col. Fowler’s tragic death." --------------------------
I was on leave back East when Col. Fowler died.
I was at Arlington the day of his burial, but didn't know anything about it.
I worked in Maintenance Control at the time and chatted with Col. Fowler every night.
He would stop by the Control Room for a cup of coffee, a status report and a chat.
One of the finest commanders I had the honor to serve under.
I was at Minot from January 1962 to February 1967.
Jim Too
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zipper730
F-106 Skilled
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Post by zipper730 on Oct 1, 2016 14:20:05 GMT 9
I'm impressed that the F-106 was able to successfully intercept a B-58, though I'm quite surprised that the F-106 would have been restricted from going supersonic in intercepts (Bob Gordon's comment), and with the B-58's strength being speed and altitude, that they would have started the run down at 0.93 to 0.97 mach, and wouldn't have just arrived on the scene already supersonic at high altitude (unless the goal was specifically to beat the F-106 in this exercise).
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zipper730
F-106 Skilled
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Post by zipper730 on Mar 26, 2018 9:56:43 GMT 9
If I was to guess why they would operate in Close Control would be that
1. There might have been a mindset that favored everything to be controlled to the maximum extent from the center. 2. The SAGE controllers might have believed they had a better picture than the pilots did, or their bosses did, and figured they'd be better off controlling it that way
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Post by Jim on Mar 26, 2018 11:14:06 GMT 9
Old"What If'" is back!!!!!!!!!!
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Post by LBer1568 on Mar 26, 2018 23:28:01 GMT 9
The SAGE Center was a Central control point for defending their sector of America. Back then there were numerous Fighter Squadrons all around US. The original War Defense Plan was to launch Interceptors/Fighters against individual Bombers so that all Bombers were designated. Without a central control point, common Radar maps and dedicated Intercept Operators the Big Picture would not occur. This was the same concept used by AWADS and other Flying Command Posts. All the data was consolidated for use by Controllers. That's also why SAGE used early versions of Data Link to send intercept info to fighters without clogging radio channels. PS, since we didn't have enough interceptors to cover all bombers the MB-1 Genie was developed to take out multiple bombers in one strike. Lorin
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